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The primary aim of my article “Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interven-
tions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform”1 was to 
dispel the myth that had grown up around the studies Dr. Tammy Tengs 
published with Dr. John Graham: that is, the idea that government regula-
tion is responsible for, in Dr. Graham’s words, the “statistical murder”2 of 
60,000 people in the United States every year.  As I demonstrated in my 
article, nothing in the work of Drs. Tengs and Graham supports Dr. Gra-
ham’s recurring charge of statistical murder through regulation.  And noth-
ing in Dr. Tengs’ response to my article casts doubt on this, my most im-
portant conclusion.  I will discuss in sequence the comments Dr. Tengs 
does provide in her response to my article. 
First, Dr. Tengs responds to my observation that a large percentage of 
the toxin controls included in their studies – indeed, seventy-nine out of 
ninety of the toxin controls analyzed in their “Opportunity Costs” study – 
were never mandated by a regulatory agency.  Dr. Tengs implies that I 
believe it is a general flaw of their work that they included unimplemented 
life-saving measures in their analysis.  I do not believe this.  However, it 
clearly is a mistake to refer to life-saving measures that were never under-
taken as if they were undertaken.  As I observe in my article, Dr. Graham 
himself has made this mistake more than once. 
In addition, it would also be a mistake to “reallocate” money from un-
implemented programs to implemented ones.  If, for example, Drs. Tengs 
and Graham wrongly assumed that some unimplemented environmental 
controls had in fact been implemented, and “reallocated” the costs of the 
unimplemented programs, then the effect would have been to “take” 
money from programs that were not in fact spending any money in order to 
give it to other programs.  In my article, this assertion had to remain little 
more than speculation because Drs. Tengs and Graham declined to respond 
to my requests for basic information about their research.  While writing 
my article, I asked Drs. Tengs and Graham what I thought was a quite 
straightforward question: for the seventy-nine toxin controls that had not 
  
 1. Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over 
Regulatory Reform, 13 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment  151 (2002). 
 2. H.R. Comm. on Science, Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis, 104th Cong. 1124 (1995) 
(written testimony of John D. Graham). 
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been required by regulation, but that were included in their “Opportunity 
Costs” study, what implementation rate had the authors assumed?  Neither 
author responded to my inquiry. 
Despite Dr. Tengs’ renewed opportunity, in her response to my article, 
to answer my basic question about her research, she still has not supplied 
any specific response.  For at least fifty-nine of the toxin controls, we do 
know that the authors assumed an implementation rate of greater than zero 
even though these very expensive controls were never mandated.  We also 
now know that Drs. Tengs and Graham concluded that at least some firms 
have voluntarily undertaken toxin controls costing millions of dollars per 
life saved.  We are told that the basis for this questionable assumption was 
“expert elicitation,” but we are told nothing about why the “experts” 
viewed this conclusion as reasonable.  Nor are we told which rules were 
assumed to be voluntarily implemented and to what extent.  Ironically, as 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Dr. 
Graham has warned agencies against accepting research results based on 
just the kind of unavailable and irreproducible data on which his own stud-
ies appear to rely. 
Dr. Tengs also defends the “Opportunity Costs” selection of 187 life-
saving interventions by saying that there is “no way of knowing whether 
the 187 analyzed interventions are representative of the universe of lifesav-
ing interventions.”  This claim is mistaken.  Ninety of the interventions 
were toxin controls; of these ninety interventions, fully eighty-one arose 
from statutory provisions that are either formally or effectively obsolete 
and that were so even before Tengs and Graham’s studies were published.  
For these interventions, at least, comprising almost half of the data set of 
this study, the one thing we do know is that they are not representative of 
the regulatory universe. 
Second, Dr. Tengs defends the decision to limit her research to the op-
portunity costs of life-saving interventions, saying that this limit was most 
sensible from a “scientific perspective.”  It may well be true that Dr. 
Tengs’ analysis was made more tractable and manageable by the decision 
to limit the analytical universe, but it also remains true that many more 
“statistical murders” would have been uncovered by extending their analy-
sis to, say, the vast spending on government subsidies for resource extrac-
tion, military defense, and even consumer products.  Indeed, the logic of 
Drs. Tengs and Graham’s own research would imply that such an exten-
sion would make sense: after all, the very premise of their research is that 
we should enlarge our range of vision to consider the opportunities we are 
missing by spending resources the way we do now.  If one were interested 
in maximizing life-saving, one would think the last programs to be cut – 
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rather than the first and only, as in Drs. Tengs and Graham’s research – 
would be programs that save lives. 
Third, Dr. Tengs observes that many non-environmental interventions 
have benefits that were not captured in her analysis, and thus it is not clear, 
she says, that the analysis is systematically skewed against environmental 
interventions.  I agree with the first point but am much less clear about the 
second.  Safety and medical interventions – which generally fare better 
than environmental measures in Dr. Tengs’ analysis – have humans as their 
central concern; helmet laws, for example, cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination be described as ecologically beneficial.  Environmental con-
trols, in contrast, almost invariably protect both humans and ecosystems, 
and thus a singular focus, in cost-effectiveness analysis, on human lives or 
life-years saved will miss much of what environmental law is about. 
Fourth, Dr. Tengs defends her studies’ assumption that not all human 
lives are equally worth saving.  As for the inequality inherent in consider-
ing life-years rather than lives saved, Dr. Tengs states that this approach 
does not discriminate against the elderly because “an intervention that ex-
tends the life of an elderly person by five years would be treated the same 
as one that extends the life of a young person by five years.”  True enough, 
but guess who mostly falls in the category of people whose lives can be 
extended only five years?  The elderly.  And guess who mostly falls in the 
category of young people whose lives can be extended only five years?  
The sick.  Both of these five-years-left-to-live groups will systematically 
be deemed less worthy of life-saving interventions, under Dr. Tengs’ ap-
proach, than will the young and healthy.  Dr. Tengs and others are free, of 
course, to defend this kind of inequality as a matter of policy advocacy, but 
they should keep in mind that the approach they are defending is not a sci-
entific choice. 
Dr. Tengs also defends her use of the technique of discounting, which 
steeply devalues lives saved in the future compared to lives saved today.  
She cites the findings of the U.S. Panel on Cost-effectiveness in Health and 
Medicine as support for this methodology.  Again, however, the decision 
whether to treat lives saved in the future – including lives in future genera-
tions – differently from lives saved today is not a scientific choice; thus it 
is not the kind of choice that an appeal to professional consensus will re-
solve.  Tengs also wheels out the shopworn argument that discounting is 
necessary because without it we will never spend a penny on life-saving, 
but instead keep our life-saving money in the bank forever, watching it 
accumulate interest for decades, even centuries, without ever spending it to 
alleviate human suffering.  This claim, formally known as the Keeler-
Cretin paradox, is fantastical. 
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With regard to discounting, Dr. Tengs also implies that it makes little 
difference to the outcome of cost-effectiveness analyses because toxin con-
trols save so few lives to begin with.  In other research, however, I have 
demonstrated that discounting future lives can increase the costs per life 
saved of toxin controls by several orders of magnitude.3  Moreover, al-
though Dr. Tengs is correct that many toxin controls are estimated to pre-
vent only a handful of cancer cases, in many cases cancer prevention is not 
the primary purpose of toxin control.  In addition – and here we circle back 
around to the beginning – most toxin controls that prevent, say, only a frac-
tion of a cancer case, are the same toxin controls that have never been 
mandated by any regulatory agency. 
Finally, Dr. Tengs responds to my criticisms of John Graham’s misuse 
of his own studies by saying that these issues were considered during the 
hearings on Dr. Graham’s nomination to head the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs.  Indeed they were.  And, after this airing of Dr. 
Graham’s views, Dr. Graham’s nomination received thirty-seven negative 
votes – more negative votes than any of President Bush’s other nominees 
for offices relating to environmental regulation. 
 
Lisa Heinzerling, Esq.* 
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